Prigozhin: A Bitter End or The Greatest Trick

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Two months have passed since the alleged Evgeny Prigozhin’s ‘coup,’ multiple versions and the deconstruction of the events by various media outlets and experts. Right on the second ‘anniversary’ of Wagner’s ‘March on Moscow’ the media leader of the paramilitary company and some of his close subordinates are suspected of dying in the private jet crash. It feels like the events of the 24th of August should have been seen as the final chord of Evgeny Prigozhin’s military and media career and leave all the theories of his involvement in shady Russian politics resolved. However, the coda of the Prigozhin’s summer opus still leaves more questions than answers.

“The Black Spot”

The solution to the events of June 24th made by Russian President Vladimir Putin was unexpected for most of the observers:

However, Wagner was not to be dismantled entirely – the ones who declined Putin’s offer to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense had a chance to proceed to Belorussia to train local troops. Also, Wagner forces were to remain in African countries to support existing operations.

It may seem Vladimir Putin spared the lives of the Wanger command and all those participating in June’s ‘March.’ Although, some patriotic analysts and former Chief of Staff members pointed out that the ‘March’ was an act of treason, a criminal offence, and, alongside the caused casualties of the Russian air force, including Putin, will not let the perpetrators avoid the responsibility.

During the Kremlin meeting on the June 29th, Putin tried to mediate the conflict between the Wagner group and the Ministry of Defense. He even proposed to retain the command structure if they legalize themselves within regular Russian troops. However, regardless of his comrades’ visible signs of agreement, Evgeny Prigozhin openly refused to comply, seemingly putting his interests higher than others.

Putin tends to be irritated when those who are supposed to comply ignore his goodwill and mediation efforts or even criticize him during round tables (like it happened with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and musician Yuri Shevchuk). What is more important is that treason itself is something Putin never forgets and never forgives. Vladimir Putin once mentioned in an interview in 2018 that betrayal (read treason), in his understanding, is an unforgivable act. It is probably the result of his political career, KGB background and witnessing how particular hierarchs of the Soviet leadership dismantled the country. Furthermore, Putin’s attitude toward spies and traitors was very vibrant after Sergei Skripal’s poisoning. Putin called him a “traitor” without any signs of pity, regardless of the true circumstances of the poisoning. Thus, speaking in Robert Louis Stevenson’s terms after his ‘March,’ Prigozhin, in the eyes of Vladimir Putin, committed an act of betrayal and got a “black spot,” became a marked man and was supposed to die. The last straws could be his appearance at the African summit in St. Petersburgh in 2023 and his frequent visits to Moscow despite expulsion to Belarus.

The Western and Ukrainian media outlets immediately transmitted this course of events and the Kremlin’s trace in eliminating Prigozhin. It was surprising because Kyiv tried to use any means to maintain the image of weak Russia and bravely resisting Ukrainian soldiers, also boosting the morale of the military suffering severe casualties during the summer “counter-offensive.” Ironically, the same version was supported in multiple Telegram channels and among those who showed discontent with the course of the Special Military Operation. For those who believe in the Kremlin’s attack, it does not matter whether an explosive device was planted on the jet, it was an attack by the aircraft or whether air defense was involved. The main motive is Putin’s and Kremlin’s intention to eliminate the clingy piece from the chessboard. Furthermore, previous track record of strange deaths, like Litvinenko in the UK, Politkovskata on Putin’s birthday, Nemtsov in front of the Kremlin and others, supports the version.

“And like that… he is gone”

The circumstances preceding the crash may seem like a mistake or treason (very close to a paraphrase of Pavel Milyukov’s: “Is this stupidity or is it treason?”). For instance, the death could be a result of negligence from the Prigozhin’s and Wagner’s security or, in the worst case, Russian military command. Immediately after the jet crash, some Russian journalists speculated whether the Ukrainian military used missiles to reach Moscow District or whether it was an explosive device. The first scenario is unlikely without Russian higher command sanction, which would have been too evident and devastating in public as an act of revenge or ‘treason’ of former comrades. The second was possible but revealed intentional passive participation by the Russian military or a fatal mistake committed by the Wagner commanders: they neglected security requirements, gathered the crucial members on a single jet and did not commit to the second technical check before departing from Moscow.

Remembering Wagner’s substantial background in the African political, military and business landscape, and Prigozhin’s tools to disguise himself alongside multiple passports, it is very naïve to believe they would commit such a mistake. Evgeny Prigozhin claimed multiple times he was ready to die, including the consequences related to June’s ‘March’. Thus, those on the jet believed there was no threat to their lives, and all precautions were met. The latter leads to the previous version of the Kremlin’s revenge or internal struggle within Wagner. Nothing could be achieved without a mole within Wagner or intel from Russian intelligence, even if Ukrainian intelligence was involved.

Nevertheless, another viable version is voiced by the Russian financial analyst and journalist Igor Vittel during the podcast on Radio Komsomolskaya Pradva. Vittel quoted Verbal, played by Kevin Spacey, from the motion picture The Usual Suspects: “After that my guess is that you will never hear from him again. The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he did not exist. And like that… he is gone.” He suspected the whole crash was staged either with the Kremlin’s sanction or not. Moreover, there are arguments supporting this version. There were two jets; the one remaining returned to Moscow without any additional information about the passengers. Also, there is no evidence that Prigozhin was on the crashed jet. The expertise is still on the way. Even the U.S. officials did not confirm the death of Wagner’s media leader. A Wikipedia page about Prigozhin’s death was published shortly after the crash in multiple languages. Various media worldwide covered the crash, but the topic was rapidly overshadowed by Trump’s arrest and the Fukushima nuclear plant water disposal into the ocean.

This version is among the most viable ones: for the Kremlin, the alleged staging is favorable because it allows it to save face after the June events and grants enough time to reorganize its African operations and paramilitary involvement. For Prigozhin, it is also favorable – he remains alive and can peacefully continue his activities, if any, or retire somewhere without unwanted attention.

The Final Chord

Vladimir Putin said he had known Prigozhin for many years and was a person of a problematic fate who “made serious mistakes.” It is indeed so, and the crash is a formal end of Prigozhin’s epic and complicated life, including his recent intrusion into the Russian political developments. His path was a mix of highs and lows: an ex-convict creating catering business and reaching the highest levels of the Russian elite circle, the man creating one of the most efficient paramilitary organizations, being on the frontline of the war for, as he claimed, Russian interests, got entangled in the confrontation with the Russian highest military command and attempted to topple them, finally being ostracized to Belarus and vanishing in the dust of the burning fuselage. Prigozhin may have died or disappeared, but this fact, alongside the ongoing war, a broad conflict with the Western countries and upcoming elections in 2024, confirms that Russian elites are not in stasis – the struggle has just begun.

Weapons Against Armour. What Do the ’Red Flags’ of Foreign Sanctions Regulators Mean?

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The significant number of sanctions against Russia has naturally led to an increase in the number of attempts to circumvent them. If before the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine (SMO) in February 2022, investigations into violations of sanctions regimes against Russia were a rather rare phenomenon; over the past year and a half, their number has increased decisively.

The relevant government departments of the US, the EU and other initiators of sanctions are developing the practice of disclosing schemes for circumventing sanctions, identifying typical signs of such attempts and summarizing Russia’s experience adapting to new restrictions. A classic situation of “arms and armour” confrontation arises, when the tightening of pressure leads to the search for ways to adapt to it, and the experience of adaptation is taken into account by the initiators in order to optimise the pressure. However, in the case of sanctions, this confrontation will not last forever. It is easier for Russian business to avoid sanctions than to bypass them and risk criminal prosecution. In other words, by opting to work with friendly jurisdictions, they minimise or nullify ties with Western partners, amid their growing toxicity and riskiness.

Regulators in the United States, EU countries, Canada and other initiators of sanctions have issued a number of documents that summarise the experience of dealing with circumvention of sanctions and provide practical recommendations for stopping such transactions. They partly overlap with the experience that has been gained in countering the circumvention of sanctions against Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and other jurisdictions. However, the specifics of the Russian case are to be found in the size of the Russian economy and the level of its technical integration with the West, accumulated over the past 30 years. Accordingly, approaches to monitoring the sanctions against Russia are also being updated.

Summarising official documents, one can single out a number of “red flags” that are considered by the initiators of sanctions as indicators of circumvention of restrictive measures or, at least, suspicious transactions.

Given that the enforcement of the sanctions regime is the responsibility of the business, regulators consider red flags as part of the counterparty verification algorithm that companies build into their system of sanctions compliance—systems for monitoring compliance with the sanctions regime.

The first such indicator is the participation in the transaction of persons or organizations from countries that have not imposed sanctions against Russia. A typical situation is when a product prohibited for import into Russia is purchased by a person from a third country, and only then enters Russia. Large banks and corporations, especially those with markets in the West, are very wary of working in sanctions jurisdictions. This does not prevent small firms, sharpened directly to work with Russia, from acting as intermediaries. Therefore, a number of other “red flags” are associated with the characteristics of counterparties involved in the transaction. Warning signs include, for example, the date of registration of the company. If it was established after February 2022, then it could potentially be a company created to work with people under sanctions. The same applies to legal entities that have been inactive for a long time, but resumed their activities against the backdrop of new sanctions. The “flag” becomes even more “red” if such a company has a weak digital footprint, or none at all. The absence of a website on the Internet or a website that was clearly created in haste and with the most general information is a reason to flag the company. Attention is also drawn to the services it offers. For example, operations with dual-use goods, especially in electronics and some other high-tech niches, are a “red flag”. There are also atypical transactions here, when a company provides some services, but suddenly switches to others related to goods subject to export control or financial transactions with sanctioned persons. Countries that are part of the anti-Russian regimes of restrictive measures can also be used as an intermediary jurisdiction for the supply of sanctioned goods.

One of the scenarios is where an order is placed in the USA for this or that product by a firm in an allied country that is not affected by export controls, with the subsequent delivery of the product to Russia.

The next group of indicators is related to the nature of the transaction. Trying to split a transaction into many smaller transactions is a red flag. It says that the company does not want to get on the radar of financial intelligence in connection with the volume of funds spent or goods supplied. Another sign is excessive supply complexity. It can be expressed as a large number of intermediaries winding through several jurisdictions. The nature of the ownership structure is also an indicator. Changing the structure by transferring assets to relatives or trusted persons, in the understanding of Western regulators, can be a veiled attempt to remove the asset from sanctions.

Another group of indicators implies explicit attempts to distort information about the nature of the transaction or data about the counterparty. Among them—changing the dates of the conclusion of contracts, information about the end user, replacing product codes, embedding a product under sanctions in a product that is not covered by sanctions, distorting information about individual components included in the product, and attempts to change the data of tracking devices and monitoring systems movement of goods and vehicles. Here you can also note the disproportionately high fees to consultants, lawyers and other persons who accompany the transaction. An important sign is the desire of the counterparty to conduct a transaction using virtual currencies.

Recent criminal cases filed in the US and other Western countries on suspicion of the circumvention of the sanctions regime indicate the presence of a number of “red flags” in the alleged violations. One example is the criminal case against Russians Yevgeny Grinin, Alexei Ippolitov, Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova and Vadim Konoshchenko, as well as US citizens Alexei Breiman and Vadim Yermolenko, who are suspected of bypassing US export controls. The case file points to the creation of a number of intermediate legal entities in the United States, the alleged forgery of documents, as well as an attempt to import defence goods to Russia from the United States through Estonia. Vadim Konoschenko was arrested in Estonia and extradited to the USA. Another recent example is the arrest in the US of Russian citizens Oleg Patsuli and Vasily Besedin. They are accused of trying to supply aircraft parts to Russia, bypassing US export controls through legal entities in third countries. In another high-profile case, the Russians Artem Uss, Svetlana Kuzurgasheva, Yuri Orekhov, Timofey Telegin and Sergey Tyulakov stand accused of supplying dual-use goods from the United States to Russia via Germany and Malaysia, as well as dealing in the circumvention of the US sanctions regime against Venezuela. The number of such criminal cases has increased since February 2022, although there were precedents earlier. A resonant case was, for example, the accusation, arrest and subsequent verdict against a Russian citizen, Oleg Nikitin, and his partners in the United States and other countries. They were accused of trying to import a Vectra 40 G turbine into Russia via an intermediary company, bypassing US export controls.

Common to many criminal cases is that the basis for the accusatory documents is the electronic correspondence of the participants in the transaction, as well as signals to the authorities from the manufacturing companies, which were contacted by the accused Russian citizens and their partners.

Along with criminal cases, the number of cases of secondary sanctions, that is, blocking financial sanctions for transactions in favour of previously blocked persons, is also growing. Since the beginning of 2023, the US Treasury has imposed such sanctions on people from China, India, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and a number of other countries. Such measures usually do not lead to diplomatic friction between the United States and the authorities of these countries. Moreover, representatives of the authorities of the US, the EU and other initiating countries are actively conducting “explanatory work” with the business of those countries that have not joined the Western sanctions. “Red flags” are among the recommendations. The purpose of such work is to rely on the fact that even if a country friendly to Russia does not impose sanctions against it, businesses will be more cautious and evade transactions. To some extent, this scheme works. An indirect confirmation is, for example, the caution of banks in friendly countries in dealing with Russian counterparties. However, the size of the Russian economy is such that import and export operations will remain in demand, and business will look for workarounds. Sanctions drive entrepreneurs to pursue transactions that are potentially risky for them, distorting normal market relations. But the same market logic will push businesses to further adapt to sanctions regimes. At the same time, business is interested in minimizing risks. Therefore, an increasingly optimal strategy for entrepreneurs is a complete withdrawal from the Western markets, the search for alternative suppliers in friendly countries, as well as reliable mechanisms for financial transactions that are not related to the US dollar or other Western currencies.

Strategically, the optimal strategy is not to circumvent sanctions, which are fraught with criminal prosecution and other legal risks, and to avoid risk as such. The “Turn to the East” thus receives nourishment in the form of rational business behaviour to derisk its activities.

From our partner RIAC

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Evolutionary principles apply not only to the natural world but also to societies. Nations need to succeed and compete internationally, which drives them to develop and become more complex over time. Throughout human history, societies have transitioned from tribal structures to feudal, industrial, and post-industrial setups.

The evolution of nations is not just about developing tools like axes and computers; it’s primarily about the growth of culture and social relationships. As societies become more diverse and balanced between the state and its citizens, positive transformations occur, leading to progress and development.

At the feudal and industrialist stages of a nation’s development, the state plays an important role in allowing concentrated resources for expansion goals. This concentration takes place at the expense of people’s rights and freedoms. It also first limits and then kills innovation and internal competition. This is why all developed countries have moved away from extreme state authority, adopting checks and balances against the excessive power of the government. However, this transition has not occurred in Russia.

Throughout its history, Russia has been characterized by etatism – the prominence of state control over individuals. This trait has persisted regardless of the era or the state structure, leading to an overly dominant state in the current information society.

In Russia, etatism goes beyond just an economy with significant state intervention. It has become a norm in the public consciousness, making the state an absolute value that influences not only the economy and politics but also culture and more. Citizens are ingrained with a philosophy of obligation towards the state, even to the point of sacrificing for its interests.

Etatism usually refers to an economy with a large amount of state intervention, but in Russia, this process is more multi-dimensional. The state is metaphysically designated as a super-value in ideological discourse, leading to its absolutist significance not only in the economy but also in politics, culture, and beyond. The current version of statism is also supplemented by a philosophy of obligation, the essence of which is that citizens/subjects are enjoined to owe their homeland-state, or at least to suffer for its interests.

Despite economic challenges and declining standards of living for many Russians, a significant portion of the population remains reliant on the state. Historically, a philosophy of court service and dependence on the state has been ingrained in Russian society. This mentality persists today, making “free” individuals who are relatively independent of the state less popular among the majority.

The authorities seem to encourage a limited functioning of the market economy promoting over-reliance on the state to maintain control. This creates a loyalist majority that is patient and willing to accept lower standards of living, which the regime can leverage for its stability.

As a result, the state has a super-dominant influence over Russian society, leaving little room for opposition. The majority of people are economically dependent on the state, such as pensioners, state employees, and recipients of various benefits. This creates a situation where society becomes increasingly compliant and controllable.

Russia appears remarkably different from the Western world, not because of its “Eurasian” or “Asian” identity but because it staunchly opposes progress and development. Instead of moving forward, it retreats backward, creating an atmosphere of isolation. While the world seeks integration, Russia emphasizes sovereignty and erects new barriers, isolating itself behind iron curtains.

As human rights and equality become universal principles, Russia introduces laws that counterbalance these trends, imposing its domestic order. In the domain of research, we see how the globalization of science leads to brain drain as scientists flee the country when Russia restricts its research by centralizing control under the state.

While secularism experiences a renaissance worldwide, Russia unites religion with the state, transforming it into a tool of paid propaganda. This divergent path Russia follows generates “Russophobia,” a term the Kremlin battles on the global stage.

Over the years, Russia has moved significantly in this regressive direction, and it is crucial to comprehend the road taken and the implications ahead. This backward movement received momentum when Putin started to strengthen the nomenclature at the expense of capitalist elites in the early 2000s. This has led to a return to a more primitive economic form – state capitalism, based not on market mechanisms but on distributive principles akin to a palace economy.

Consequently, power becomes concentrated and managerial. However, this transformation comes at a cost, as the political model starts resembling a feudal kingdom where the tzar and his lords lack the concept of private property and the advanced mechanisms that modern societies rely on for development.

Feudal relationships become evident not only in the economy but in society and culture. The recent mutiny of Prigozhin was a typical mutiny of a lord against the tzar. And it was settled among them, other lords did not interfere in the conflict that they felt should not affect them. It is quite unusual and misleading to see contemporary state power structures like FSB, army, or police loyal first to their heads (lords) and then to the President (tzar). Nevertheless, if you apply principles of feudal relations to today’s Russia many societal and economic dynamics may become less enigmatic.

Ironically, the fact that Russia went backward to the feudal type of state helped it avoid totalitarianism. Ironically, while totalitarian elements are present, Russia lacks the true totalitarianism seen in European dictatorships of the 20th century, as it lacks the full integration of modernity. Russian society is atomized, with no national ideology unifying it. Nevertheless, in the information age, references to historical events like the Great Terror of the 1930s can be exploited to create an atmosphere of fear and maintain control over society.

At the beginning of the XXth century, Russia was among the first leading countries of the world where large private capital originated from state property. Assets were distributed based on class distinction and granted as remuneration for service and achievements in the monarchy’s interests. With the abolition of serfdom and the formation of the labor market, independent commercial and industrial capital emerged, driving the country’s economic growth.

Russia attracted foreign direct investment and technology, gaining prominence in the global economic system. However, delayed political reforms hindered further development, leading to a decline in the economy, worsened by World War I and subsequent revolutionary events.

Stalin tried to recreate the country forcing it into an industrial state. He tried to destroy archaic consciousness impeding the Soviet Union’s modernization. And he finally succeeded in implanting new values and modes of behavior creating “a Soviet Man”.

The Soviet economic model partially resembled early capitalist development in Russia, but in essence, it represented a step backward from the industrial relations of the Tsarist era. The USSR introduced restrictions on citizen mobility and compulsory labor conscription, abolished private ownership of means of production, and replaced market material responsibility with administrative and criminal responsibility. After a period of stagnation during the Cold War, the USSR ceased to exist as an economic and political entity in 1992.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia had a chance to transform into a modern society. The transformation required modernization and democratization of state institutes and society along with the adoption of a legal culture suited to the New Age, including the recognition of private property. In the West this culture emerged as a direct consequence of the transition to a capitalist economy and the rise of the bourgeoisie, replacing the feudal lords as the ruling class.

In the 1990s, privatization in the new Russia led to the formation of large private capital, increased productivity, and the renewal of fixed assets. However, in the following decade, the role of the state in the economy and social relations began to increase. The state’s control over property shifted due to its direct influence and involvement of bureaucrats and affiliated individuals in enterprise capital. This shift towards state hegemony was initiated by the political elite and supported by those adhering to etatic thinking, which prioritizes the subordination of private interests to the state. As a result, Russia’s governance regressed towards a feudal type of system.

The desire to recreate state hegemony is rooted in historical continuity. Generations of economically active citizens have grown up in conditions where the state plays a dominant role in public and economic life. Building a full-fledged market economy presents challenges and risks, leading some to prioritize risks and accept limited gains, while others leverage the state’s monopoly powers to further private or group interests.

In the 21st century, Russia’s return to a market economy has been gradually replaced by the etatization of the economy, resulting in stagnation, militarism, and suppression of political and civil liberties. Russian society failed to translate its growing economic power into guarantees of personal freedoms as autocrats strip ordinary Russians of real power.

Moreover, Russian backward drift is reflected in diminished cultural influence. The state now dictates creative trends, and themes for movies and books, leading to less competition, greater unification, and a lack of freedom of thought in the cultural realm. As a result, Russian culture of the late 20th and early 21st centuries remains relatively unknown and uninteresting to developed societies.

The development off nations created institutions to manage economy and society. And Russia is still managed by personalities, while all the necessary institutions formerly exist. Understanding Russian mysteries and enigmas can be achieved by analyzing its economy, sociology, and the psychology of its political elites with a medieval approach, when lords matter, not institutions. The question remains whether Russia’s journey towards the past can be reversed, or if the country will continue sliding back into the Dark Ages, serving as an example of a nation that failed to embrace modernity.

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Is Russia losing India? They raise this question at practically every conference, workshop or an expert meeting on Russian-Indian relations since the times of the Soviet disintegration in early 1990s. Quite often, the predominant views expressed by participants are pessimistic, if not alarmist.

Yes, Russia is losing India or it might lose India in the near future unless some dramatic actions are not urgently taken. Such pessimism and alarmism are not really surprising—academics, unlike politicians, usually focus more on problems and challenges rather than on accomplishments and opportunities.

Of course, the mere fact that we keep talking about “Russia losing India” for thirty years suggests that such conclusions are at least premature and one-sided. However, it is hardly possible to simply dismiss the gloomy predictions as groundless and untenable.

The problem areas

Indeed, positions taken by Moscow and New Delhi on many of the important Eurasia and global issues—from Ukraine to Afghanistan, from “One Belt, One Road” to Quad and to the concept of Indo-Pacific are not identical, which sometimes leads to suspicion and the erosion of mutual trust that has always been a solid foundation of the bilateral relations. In 2020 and in 2022 Russia and India did not even hold their traditional annual summits and it is not clear when President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have their next face-to-face meeting again.

The military-technical cooperation, which has always been considered the indestructible bedrock of bilateral relations, is going through a period of severe stress. Over the last five years, Russia’s share of Indian defense imports went down from 60% to 45% and is likely to shrink even further in the near future. Moscow has to confront the rapid expansion of the Western presence in the Indian arms markets and the current “Made in India” strategy pursued by the Indian leadership. On top of that, there are questions in India about the reliability of Russian weapons, Russia’s compliance with delivery deadlines and the after-sales customer service and warranties.

The trade between the two nations might look like a bright spot in this rather bleak picture: it skyrocketed in 2022 and reached an unprecedented $35 billion. However, this spectacular (2.5 times!) growth became possible almost exclusively due to an explosive increase of Russia’s deliveries of crude oil, as well as of coal and fertilisers to India. In view of the massive Westen economic sanctions and the rapid demise of the Russia-EU strategic energy partnership, Moscow had to sell a lot of its oil to India at heavily discounted prices. On the other hand, the Indian export to Russia did not change in any significant way over the last year—neither in overall numbers, nor in its structure. As a result, we now observe a very significant Russia-India trade imbalance, which questions sustainability of the recent spectacular progress in this domain.

But India is rising

The list of problems and warning signs can be extended. Of course, they should not be blown out of all proportion.

The whole idea that someone—be it Moscow, Washington or Beijing—can ‘lose’ India looks excessively arrogant, if not completely preposterous. The country is simply too big, too powerful and too important for the whole world to be ‘lost’ by anyone. The history of multifaceted and fruitful cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi is lengthy enough for the future of this cooperation not to be called into question by somewhat worrisome, but not unexpected, economic or political developments of recent years. This cooperation reflects long-term interests of the two nations and it is there to stay.

At the same time, modern India has a booming economy, a vibrant society and an ambitious leadership; its current foreign policy and security portfolio are much larger and more diverse than they were half a century or even two decades ago. It should come as no surprise that Russia’s relative share in this portfolio may become more modest—not because New Delhi has decided to break away from its traditional friendship with Moscow, but because India is committed to exploring new international opportunities as well. Still, despite the ongoing diversification of the New Delhi’s foreign policy portfolio, the “privileged strategic partnership” that unites the two countries continues to serve as a model for relations between the great powers even when the parties “agree to disagree” on some specific issues.

Nevertheless, the state of Russian-Indian relations in no way justifies any complacency. The problems of these relations are not limited to the institutional inertia, red tape, lack of imagination, or destructive interference by third parties. The need for a thorough reassessment of the relationship derives from the understanding of general trends in the development of world politics of our times.

Managing India and China

The modern world is evolving, albeit slowly and reluctantly, in the direction of a new geopolitical, economic and technological bipolarity. This is clearly not what most of us hoped for earlier this century, but this trend cannot be ignored and it affects both Moscow and New Delhi.

Year after year, Russia is moving farther east, strengthening and developing its multiple ties with China. Year after year, India is shifting further west, increasing various forms of cooperation with the United States. This is the reality we have to acknowledge before moving any further.

This trend contains considerable risks. If it continues in the medium term, the two friendly nations may eventually find themselves in opposing geopolitical, economic and technological blocs. The idea of a ‘common Eurasian space’ will remain a pipe-dream, and our vast common continent will remain split between the East and the West for an indefinite future. The Cold War system of the 20th century will be once again resurrected in the international system of the 21st century. Over time, it will become increasingly difficult for Moscow and New Delhi to even maintain bilateral cooperation at the current level, let alone its possible deepening and broadening.

Neither Moscow nor New Delhi today has the resources and opportunities needed to radically reverse this unfortunate and destructive trend in the ongoing evolution of the international system. Russia and India are not in a position to restore the integrity of the system either individually or even jointly. However, this does not mean that Moscow and New Delhi should be resigned to the role of passive observers of the coming era of rigid international bipolarity. Russia and India (as well as many nations all over the world—from Europe and the Middle East to Africa and Latin America) have a lot to lose and not much to gain if they are forced to take sides in the brewing US-China conflict. It is in their common interests to resist the emerging bipolarity and, where possible, to mitigate its negative repercussions, with an emphasis on promoting multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation.

For example, Russia, India and China are members of the BRICS and the SCO. Moscow and New Delhi should make additional efforts to ensure that these institutions are not going to evolve into “the leagues of extraordinary gentlemen”, but instead will become effective tools in the search for a common denominator in even the most sensitive security and development issues. Furthermore, Moscow should abstain from any temptations to try building any “anti-Western clubs” out of such multilateral fora—it would not be possible to sell such an approach to India anyway. Instead, BRICS and SCO should be used to search for compromises, including between China and India. RIC—a separate trilateral coordination mechanism with the participation of Russia, India and China—could also develop in this direction.

India—The global swing state

In Moscow, one must always keep in mind that India is not only the largest democracy on the planet. It is also the largest Eurasian and global swing state, determining success or failure of any large-scale economic or geopolitical initiative in Eurasia. If India remains forever out of the OBOR or RCEP projects, these projects will be of only limited practical importance for the continent. If India joins any of them in this or that format at some point in future, the projects will rise to another level, acquiring not only regional, but also truly continental scale and impact.

Only with an active participation from India, is the Quad turning into a real military-political factor in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; without India’s active involvement, the Quad would do little to supplement the United States’ existing bilateral military-political ties with Japan and Australia. In sum, without an active Indian role any hope for the reunification of Eurasia looks completely hopeless. And without reuniting Eurasia a new rigid global bipolarity looks practically unavoidable.

The future of Eurasia

Ultimately, the future of Eurasia depends crucially on the future of Sino-Indian relations. None of the external players, including Russia, can “fix” these relations instead of Beijing and New Delhi. However, external players, including Russia, are able to contribute to the “reset” of these relations by creating incentives for both sides to interact with each other in trilateral or other multilateral formats. An alternative approach—namely, balancing Beijing and New Delhi against each other—may give Moscow some situational advantages, but would not serve Russia’s long-term strategic interests.

Moscow could offer India and China new opportunities for trilateral cooperation in the Arctic, in Central Asia and in the Russian Far East. It could seek to involve its two strategic partners in triangular IT and cyber initiatives, where the three countries complement each other in many important ways. Agriculture and the food processing industry could be other areas of multilateral cooperation. Great opportunities are opening up in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, etc.

In general, policymakers in Moscow should not approach India and China as two parallel strands of Russian foreign policy, between which a choice has to be made or which must be developed separately from each other.

On the contrary, Beijing and New Delhi should be treated as partners whose value to Russia increases in proportion to the increase in their ability to work actively with each other. Likewise, politicians in New Delhi should approach the Russian-Chinese cooperation not as a strategic challenge, but as an opportunity to assist in sorting out some of its own problems with Beijing. This is the formula for the “project-based multilateralism” that might become a real game-changer for international relations in Eurasia.

Such a change would require a lot of expert knowledge, diplomatic skills and political will from all those involved in working on Russia-Indian relations. Still, the anticipated returns fully justify the necessary investment. As it has been wisely noted, “the secret of change is to focus all of your energy not on fighting the old, but on building the new”.

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BRICS leaders’ declaration